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The	fallacy	of	basic	economic	rights
One	of	the	main	questions	dividing	the	left	and	the	right	is	about	how	economic	rights	rank	compared	to	other	rights
and	public	goals.	That	is,	the	question	is	about	what	can	or	cannot	outweigh	economic	rights.
Basic	vs	prima	facie	rights
The	left	regularly	argues	that	economic	rights	can	be	outweighed	by	legitimate	state	interests,	like	social	justice,	such
that	they	are	“prima	facie	rights”.	Some	scholars	representing	the	right,	conversely,	have	recently	sought	to	elevate
economic	rights	to	the	status	of	“basic	rights”.	This	terminology	follows	the	work	of	John	Rawls	for	whom	a	right	is
“basic”	when	it	can	only	be	outweighed	by	other	basic	rights	and	when	other	aspects	of	justice	can	be	pursued	only
by	those	means	that	fully	respect	the	basic	rights.
The	objective	of	many	neoclassical	liberals,	libertarians,	and	conservatives,	who	defend	economic	rights	as	basic,	is
to	counter	extensive	programs	of	taxes	and	transfers.	This	divide,	I	believe,	is	fictitious.	Economic	rights	cannot	be
basic.	The	divide	also	obscures	the	real	dilemma	we	face	regarding	economic	rights	–	it	is	not	true	that	by	making
such	rights	increasingly	strong	compared	to	other	rights	we	also	increase	economic	freedom.	Quite	the	contrary,
doing	so	may	weaken	economic	freedom.
Let	me	explain	the	fallacy	of	basic	economic	rights.	There	is	no	genuine	disagreement,	I	should	mention,	about	the
nature	of	economic	rights	between	the	left	and	the	right	–	or	at	least	there	was	none	until	very	recently.	Economic
rights	may	be	divided	between	the	liberties	of	labour,	transacting,	holding,	and	using	property.	Such	rights	are	indeed
prima	facie	rights,	I	think,	and	arguments	that	would	elevate	economic	rights	to	a	higher	status	are	potentially
dangerous.
Eminent	domain	–	the	expropriation	of	land	for	public	use
We	may	recall	that	classical	liberals	like	Friedrich	Hayek	or	Milton	Friedman	who	have	most	enthusiastically
defended	the	importance	of	economic	rights	nonetheless	accepted	that	a	public	agency	may	expropriate	someone’s
private	property	if	it	deems	it	to	be	in	the	public	interest	–	say,	to	build	a	military	base.	If	economic	rights	were	basic,
conversely,	your	local	government	could	not	build	a	major	highway	crucial	for	the	development	of	your	region	if	one
irritable	landlord	were	to	refuse	to	sell	his	land.	Eminent	domain	is	an	established	practice	today,	and	though	many
cases	are	problematic,	the	overall	practice	is	nevertheless	essential	for	our	economic	freedom.	We	may	review	two
cases	to	pinpoint	one	problem	that	is	often	obscured	today.
The	case	of	Kelo	v.	City	of	New	London
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First,	consider	Kelo	v.	City	of	New	London	(545	U.S.	469	(2005)).	A	redevelopment	plan	was	supposed	to	revitalize
the	ailing	economy	of	the	city	of	New	London,	Connecticut,	and	therefore	the	city	purchased	property	in	the	Fort
Trumbull	neighbourhood,	through	its	development	agent,	and	sought	to	enforce	eminent	domain	to	acquire	land	from
owners	unwilling	to	sell.	Pfizer	Corporation	was	supposed	to	build	research	facilities	on	the	land,	and	thus	the	city
initiated	condemnation	proceedings	when	the	owners	of	the	rest	of	the	property,	the	petitioners,	refused	to	sell.
The	Supreme	Court,	in	a	controversial	5-4	decision,	justified	the	enforcement	of	eminent	domain	under	the	Takings
Clause	of	the	Fifth	Amendment,	saying	“nor	shall	private	property	be	taken	for	public	use,	without	just
compensation.”	Economic	development,	the	Court	ruled,	qualifies	as	“public	use”	under	the	said	clause.	This	case,
however,	is	moved	by	a	reverse-Robin	Hood	understanding	of	the	clause	–	taking	from	the	poor	and	giving	to	the
rich.	The	decision	also	eliminates	the	distinction	between	private	and	public	use	of	property,	since	the	taking	was	for
the	benefit	of	Pfizer.
The	case	of	Hawaii	Housing	Authority	v.	Midkiff
Second,	consider	Hawaii	Housing	Authority	v.	Midkiff	(467	U.S.	229	(1984)),	which	is	a	case	of	oligopoly	in	land
ownership.	Twenty-two	landowners	owned	about	72	per	cent	of	fee	simple	titles	on	the	island	of	Oahu,	where	about
two-thirds	of	the	population	of	Hawaii	live.	The	land	being	concentrated	to	such	an	extent	in	the	hands	of	a	few
private	owners	was	a	remnant	of	the	feudal	system	and	the	caste	organization	in	Hawaii.	That	is,	traditionally,	the	aliʻi
nui	and	kaukau	aliʻi	lines	ruled	and	controlled	the	main	Hawaiian	Islands.	The	Hawaii	State	Legislature,	therefore,
used	eminent	domain	to	take	land	and	redistribute	it	to	private	residents.
In	an	8-0	decision,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	such	redistribution	was	constitutional,	as	a	legitimate	exercise	of	the
police	powers	to	correct	a	market	failure.	Though	one	may	disagree	with	the	rationale	of	the	decision,	as	well	as	with
the	rational	basis	test	used	to	arrive	at	that	decision,	there	was	manifestly	a	problem	that	needed	to	be	addressed	–
people	could	practically	not	become	homeowners	on	Oahu.
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These	two	cases	are	indicative	of	an	under-appreciated	ambiguity	concerning	economic	rights.	We	all	agree	that
individuals	have	property	rights,	and	that	these	rights	may	be	outweighed	by	some	considerations,	say,	of	utility.	But
not	any	consideration	will	do.	We	should	not	take	from	the	least	well	off	to	then	give	to	the	best	off	as	in	the	Kelo
case	–	this	cannot	be	understood	as	a	compelling	state	interest.	Yet	that	people	could	live	their	entire	lives	without
ever	having	the	opportunity	to	own	their	homes	is	a	problem.	For	families	who	have	lived	on	Oahu	for	generations,
we	may	think,	not	being	able	to	buy	a	house	is	a	compelling	reason	to	use	eminent	domain.	The	access	to
homeownership	is	most	probably	a	vital	component	of	economic	freedom.
The	fallacy,	then,	is	to	think	that	making	economic	rights	stronger	will	automatically	lead	to	increased	economic
freedom,	and	vice	versa.	The	Heritage	Foundation	Index	of	Economic	Freedom,	for	example,	takes	into	account	the
risk	of	expropriation	to	measure	the	degree	of	economic	freedom	in	the	world’s	countries.	The	greater	the	risk,	the
least	freedom	people	have.	But	the	Midkiff	and	the	Kelo	cases	show	that	expropriation	can	lead	either	to	more	or
less	economic	freedom.	If	homeownership	is	a	component	of	economic	freedom,	the	possibility	of	expropriation	may
be	desirable.
The	real	question,	therefore,	as	Hayek	noted,	is	about	“the	conditions	under	which	the	particular	rights	of	individuals
or	groups	may	occasionally	be	infringed	in	the	public	interest”	(page	217).	If	the	total	amount	of	economic	freedom
can	be	increased	by	having	some	economic	right	outweighed	in	some	circumstances,	then	such	rights	should	not	be
basic.
♣♣♣
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